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INTRODUCTION

Conflicts between the public duties and private interests of government officials have received considerable attention and have
produced a variety of legislative and executive actions. President
Carter laid down high standards of behavior for his appointees;
Congress tightened its financial disclosure requirements in 1977
* Research Fellow, Australian National University; Barrister of Gray's Inn
(London), 1976. LL.B., 1971, Queensland, Australia; LL.M., 1973, Harvard; D.
Phil., 1976, Oxford, England. The author acknowledges the assistance of Colin
A. Hughes, Professorial Fellow, Australian National University, and Ann M.
Pickering in the preparation of this article.
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and the Ethics in Government Act of 1978' embodies some of these
measures in legislation.2 Britain established a register of Parliamentarians' interests in 1975 and a Royal Commission has made
a report on the standards of behavior in public life. 3 An Australian
Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended a register of Parliamentarians' interests in 1975,1 and now a Committee of Inquiry5 is
determining whether principles for the resolution of conflicts between public duty and private interest can be developed for Ministers, Parliamentarians, public servants, and other public officials.
This article outlines the existing law and practice involving conflicts of interest in the United States, Britain, and Australia, each
of which exhibits a high level of economic and industrial advancement. United States developments are important because these
far-reaching measures have been adopted by other governments.
Because many countries have adopted the Westminister model of
Parliamentary government, Britain's enviable record of high standards in public life demands examination. Australia ostensibly
adopted the Westminister model with certain modifications which
provide Australia with a federal system and a written constitution
granting its High Court the power to review and invalidate legislation.

II.

THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A.

Background Variables

The standard of behavior in public life is related to social, economic, and political factors. Corruption is prominent in many
Third World countries because politicans and bureaucrats have
not yet developed systems and norms by which behavior can be
divorced from such factors as ethnic loyalty, nor have their economic systems developed to such a degree that minor public servants are paid enough to avoid the "need" for the petty corruption
1. See text accompanying note 111 infra.
2. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. 701 & 5 U.S.C.
app.).
3. ROYAL COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1974-1976, CMND
No. 6524 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SALMON REPORT].
4. JOINT COMM. ON PECUNIARY INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, DECLARATION OF INTERESTS (1975) [hereinafter cited as RIORDAN REPORT].
5. Headed by a federal judge, Chief Justice Bowen.
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which exists. Third World bureaucracies are both elaborate and
inefficient, it is said, .so that "the provision of strong personal
incentives to bureaucrats to cut red tape may be the only way of
speeding the establishment of the new firm."'
Over the last century more electoral corruption has occurred in
the United States than Britain. Contributing factors to this corruption include the greater dispersal of political power due to the
north-south division, ethnicity, federalism, and the tripartite separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The American city boss developed as the political entrepeneur who
integrated power and "got things done."'7 V.O. Key remarked that

the political role of money in the United States has been to integrate the diverse interests and groups in American society.8 In
contrast, the level of electoral corruption has declined in Britain
since the late nineteenth century. It has been suggested that political attitudes have grown more homogeneous so that since the nineteenth century it has become unprofitable to bribe voters on a large
scale when the results in individual constituencies are dependent
upon national trends determined by national campaigning.' Moreover, with the rise of the British Labour Party, elections took on a
relatively ideological complexion as compared with the United
States. In addition, the British civil service became a relatively
rational and internally responsible bureaucracy after the
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the 1850s.
Whatever the real level of corruption, whether it is "black" or
"grey,"' 0 it is certainly more highly publicized in the United
States, primarily because society and government in the United
States ar much more open than in Britain or Australia. Furthermore, political groups in the United States frequently raise moral
issues to win political kudos which tends to escalate moral
6. Leys, What is the Problem About Corruption?, 3 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 215,
223 (1965).

7. See Ford, Book Review, 19 PoLicAL Sci. Q. 673 (1904).
8. V. KEY, POLrICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 395-98 (4th ed. 1964).
9. POLITICAL CORRUPTION 364 (A! Heidenheimer ed. 1970) (citing Stokes,
Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Procesi, in THE AMERICAN PARTY
SYSTEM 191 (W. Chambers & W. Burnham eds. 1967)).
10. In this paper "black" corruption refers to bribery, patronage, graft and
other traditional forms of corruption, whereas "gray" corruption refers to a conflict of interest.
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stances." The fact that certain individuals and organizations
thrive on exposing shortcomings in public agencies also increases
the likelihood of publicity of public corruption.' 2 In comparison,
public morality has never received much airing in British or Australian political debate, perhaps because of a more cynical public
view of politics and politicians. In addition, Britain and Australia
have never had the "muck-raking" tradition of American newspapers, the absence of which is reflected in the British deference
toward politicans, and the fact that Australian newspapers which
are highly monopolized provide few outlets for divergent and critical views.
Blatant forms of corruption such as vote buying and bribery
("black" corruption) seem to have declined in all three countries.
The advent of the political party has already been mentioned as a
deterrent to electoral corruption. The growth of bureaucratic structures and greater scrutiny by the press decreased political corruption. The development of a civil culture and the embourgeoisement
of society gave birth to laws and administrative programs with
resulting benefits which are regarded as rights rather than as dis3
cretionary political favors.'
While flagrant forms of corruption have declined, conflicts between the public duties and the private interests of public officials
("grey" corruption) have developed. The expansion of government
activities in advanced industrial societies "produces many situations in which corruption can easily develop through favourites
and the misuse of discretionary authority on the part of administrative officials, induced by such activities on the part of the corrupter as campaign contributions, gifts, and the like."' 4 Implicit in
this statement is the fact that the forms of "undesirable behavior"
of public officials have thus become increasingly sophisticated over
time. "Black" corruption with politicans is unnecessary when society tolerates generous contributions to party coffers and campaign funds. The greater complexity of society facilitates such
"grey" corruption and at the same time makes it more difficult for
public opinion to focus condemnation on particular transactions.
11. Manning, The Purity Potlatch:An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American Government, and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239, 243-48 (1964).
12. See H. KAUFMAN, ADMINISTRATIWE FEEDBACK 10 (1973).
13. Wilson, Corruption:The Shame of the States, 2 PuB. INTERESTS 28 (1966).
14. C. FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLrlCS 155 (1972).
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B.

Defining Conflict of Interest

A conflict of interest can be broadly defined as the use of public
office to advance private interests at the expense of some public
interest. Both of the terms "private interest" and "public interest"
are admittedly vague. A "private interest" ordinarily concerns
pecuniary considerations, although promotional or status gains
may also be involved. 5 In addition, private interests may also
involve non-pecuniary considerations such as nepotism or advancement of a political party interest. Public interest is a nebulous concept, but in this context it may be useful to think of it in
terms of the opinions of the general public as expressed by elite
groups, such as newspapers or political parties. Some authors view
the terms "official duty" and "public interest" as overlapping, so
that a conflict of interest exists when an official's conduct in office
conflicts with his private economic affairs. 6 Other writers regard
a conflict of interest as one involving any of the following acts: (1)
accepting illegal rewards in exchange for action favoring those providing the reward; (2) accepting rewards for doing something that
the public official is under a duty to do in any event; (3) accepting
remuneration for an act that the official is under a duty not to do;
or (4) exercising a legitimate discretion for improper reasons. 7 In
summary, conflict of interest involves the use of public office in a
manner which ignores the public interest in order to achieve personal advantage.
Certain differences exist between conflicts of interest and corruption in the traditional sense ("black" corruption)." Gibbons
argues that in conflict of interest situations only one actor is involved; the conflict is between the actor's personal interest and his
sense of obligation to the public interest. 9 This construct fails to
take account, however, of the potential conflict of interest present
in movements of public officials into the private sector where more
than one party is clearly involved. Perhaps a more significant difference between "black" corruption and conflict of interest situations is that the latter often involves action which might further
private interests at the expense of the public interest. A conflict
15.

See PRIVY

COUNCIL, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 3

(1973) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN GREEN PAPER].
16. R. GETz, CONGRESSIONAL ETHics 3 (1967).

17.
18.
19.

McMullan, A Theory of Corruption, 9 Soc. REv. 181 (1961).
See note 10 supra.
Gibbons, The Study of Political Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION
CANADA 1, 11 (K. Gibbons & D. Rowat eds. 1976).

IN
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of interest does not necessarily involve actions which actually favor
private interests; but the appearance that such a private interest
may be favored is sufficient. Thus, a conflict of interest creates an
additional problem because the mere appearance of a conflict undermines public confidence.
Conflict of interest involves more than policy differences. The
distinction between conflict of interest and mere policy differences
rests upon whether public opinion regards certain behavior as unacceptable or attaches less value to the continuance of such behavior than to the costs generated by condemning it. Public opinion
may be swayed by such principles as maintaining the appearance
of impartiality, even though this may be overridden by the need
for expertise or commitment. For this reason, British Ministers
have been required since 1952 to divest themselves of shares held
in companies having close associations with their own departments."0 Not only must Ministers appear to be impartial between
companies, but it should also appear that they cannot personally
benefit by their official decisions." The principles against impartiality or enrichment are sometimes overshadowed by other factors
such as expertise gained. For that reason, no question has been
raised whether the British Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries, and
Food owns a farm.
III.

THE LEGAL HERITAGE

The laws regulating conflict of interest derive from a concern
over traditional forms of corruption ("black" corruption).22 Existing provisions are frequently inadequate and inconsistent and require revision in order to provide a firm basis for more expansive
conflict of interest measures.
A.

Bribery and Corruption

A statute enacted in the United States in 1853 made it a crime
for members of Congress to accept bribes.2 3 In the case of United
20. 496 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 702-03 (1952) (text of Official Report).
21. Avoiding the appearance of impropriety and preventing the possibility of
undesirable activity, however slight, are of central importance in American conflict of interest cases. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364
U.S. 520, 549-51 (1961).
22. See note 10 supra.
23. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 170 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201, 203 (1976)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 218 (1976) (a contract affected by bribery
is voidable).

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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States v. Johnson,24 the United States Supreme Court held that a
member of Congress who had been paid for making a speech in the
House of Representatives or the Senate was protected from criminal prosecution for bribery under the free speech and debate clause
of the Constitution.- In United States v. Brewster,2 the Supreme
Court held that a Senator could be prosecuted for accepting a bribe
to influence his vote on legislation before his committee. The Court
held that the "speech or debate clause" prohibits inquiry "only
into those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate
in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for
those.

'28

Under the facts in Brewster, the Court further held that

prosecution of a Senator was not constitutionally prohibited where
the focus of the prosecution was upon the Senator's acts apart from
his official actions "generally done in Congress in relation to the
business before it."29 The Court stated:
[N]o inquiry into legislative acts or motivation for legislative acts
is necessary for the Government to make out a prima facie
case. .

.

. The illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money

for a promise to act in a certain way. There is no need for the
Government to show that appellee fulfilled the illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance
of the illegal promise."
The Court further held that the Constitution did not prohibit inquiry into incidentally related acts which were not part of the
3
legislative process itself. '

The House of Commons gave as their opinion on May 2, 1695,
that the offer of money or other advantage to a Member of Parliament for the promotion of any matter to be transacted in Parliament was a high crime and misdemeanor.32 The House itself deals
with behavior in breach of this rule.33 Apart from the sanction of
24. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, para. 1. This clause is derived from the English
Bill of Rights: An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1689, 1
W. & M. 440, c. 2, art. 9, at 441.
27. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
28. Id. at 512.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 525-26.
31. Id. at 528.
32. 11 H.C. JOUR. 331 (1695). In 1945 the Commons extended the resolution:
"an offer of money to a [M.P.] in order to induce him to take up a question with
a Minister would be a breach of privilege." SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 97.

33. See T.

ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF
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reprimand, the House can suspend or expel M.P.'s, and can also
commit either M.P.'s and ordinary individuals to prison (although
this has not been done in the last century). The courts have no
jurisdiction in the area of conflicts of interest, since "neither the
statutory nor the common law applies to the bribery or attempted
bribery of [M.P.'s] in respect of [their] Parliamentary activities.""
Australian courts have held that bribery of M.P.'s is a common
law misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment." In the case
of The King v.Boston,-" the High Court of Australia accepted that
an M.P. could be charged with conspiracy for making an agreement to use his influence exclusively outside Parliament, and not
by vote or speech therein, to put pressure on a Minister on a particular matter, even though it was beneficial to the public interest.
The Court assumed that this decision was consistent with the English common law and failed to consider the question of Parliamentary privilege. Because the decision involved state Parliamentarians, however, the question remains whether the Boston decision
is applicable to the national Parliament, since the Australian Constitution provides that Parliament should have the privileges of the
House of Commons.3 7
For a number of reasons, the courts seem a more appropriate
forum for dealing with bribery of legislators than the legislatures
themselves. They have the expertise to ensure a fair trial, while in
the legislature, political considerations might prevail.3 8 History
demonstrates that when left to act upon their own initiative, legislatures are unlikely to pursue charges of corruption of members."
PARLIAMENT 142, 149 (19th ed. 1976).
34. SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 98. See Ex parte Wason, L.R. 4 Q.B. 573
(1869); SELECT CoMM. ON THE CONDUCT OF MEMBERS, CMND. No. 490 at ix-x (1977)

[hereinafter cited as MEMBERS REPORT].
35. The King v. Boston, 33 C.L.R. 386 (1923); The King v. Connolly, [1922]
St. R. Queensl. 278; The Queen v. White, 13 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 322 (1875). See also
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly v. Glass, L.R. 3 P.C. 560 (1871) (Australian
Parliament used its contempt power in a bribery case).
36. 33 C.L.R. 386 1923-24.
37. AUSTL. CONST. § 49.
38.

See 73 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 151 (1973).

39. See, e.g., G. GRAHAM, MoRALrrY IN AMERICAN POLrIcs 93 (1952). Thus, the
Salmon Report advocated legislation on the bribery of M.P.'s since bribers are
immune and public obloquy will have little effect on them, and as for M.P.s, the
absence of parliamentary action demonstrates that Parliament does not have
investigative machinery comparable to that of a police investigation. SALMON
REPORT, supra note 3, at 98-99.
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The argument in favor of legislatures retaining internal sanctioning authority is based upon the belief that the independence of a
legislature is threatened if bribery of members is under the jurisdiction of the courts.4 0 The fear which originally gave rise to the
exclusion of the courts on privilege matters-that the executive
would use criminal prosecution to harass legislators-now appears
to be unwarranted. The major problem which remains is how best
to ensure that corrupt legislators do not escape the due processes
of law." The statutory delegation of authority to the judiciary of
cases involving the bribery of legislators offers clear advantages2to
the retention of that authority by the legislatures themselves.
In the common law of the three jurisdictions under consideration, it is illegal either to offer or accept a bribe for the purpose of
influencing the performance of a public officer's duty.' : Statutory
law in the three jurisdictions also extends common law bribery to
cover solicitation and receipt of bribes by someone other than the
public official. 4 Bribery no longer involves only the payment of
money directly to a public official, but may take the form of a gift,
sponsored travel, or a contribution to campaign or party funds.
40. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 554-55 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cautioned that 18 U.S.C. § 201 makes no distinction between
campaign contributions and money for personal use. Thus, the Executive was
given wide discretion to prosecute and had enormous influence on legislators. Id.
at 558.
41. In the Boston case, the Australian court emphasized that acceptance of a
bribe operates as an incentive to serve the paymaster regardless of the public
interest. The King v. Boston, 33 C.L.R. at 393 (Knox, C.J.), 395 (Isaacs and Rich,
JJ.), 409 (Higgins, J.).
42. Legislation has already been enacted in the United States, 18 U.S.C. §§
201, 203 (1976), although it is subject to the free speech and debate clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6. In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 529-63, the dissenters
said delegation was unconstitutional. The bribery provision of the Australian
Crimes Act, 1914, § 73, does not apply to federal Parliamentarians since they are
not "Commonwealth officers." State Parliamentarians are subject to state bribery legislation, however, in those states with a criminal code. QUEENSL. CRIM.
CODE §§ 59-60; TAsM. CRIM. CODE §§ 71-72.
43. Public officer in this context clearly includes a cabinet minister, as illustrated by an old English case, The King v. Vaughan, involving the first Lord of
the Treasury. 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (K.B. 1769). E.g., The King v. Whitaker, [1914]
3 K.B. 1283; United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798); The King v.
Jones [19461 Vict. L.R. 300. There is also the common law offense of misbehavior
in public office, but the offense is vague and rarely invoked.
44. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203 (1976); Secret Commissions Act, 1905, § 4
(Austl.); Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34, § 1. Cf. Crimes Act,
1914, § 73 (Austl.).
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Although no case law exists on this point in Britain or Australia,
it has been held in the United States that the solicitation or receipt
of funds by a public officer or employee for political campaign
expenses constitutes bribery." Gifts, sponsored travel, and contributions to campaign and party funds may be made in general
terms to create a "favorable climate" for decision-making. The
absence of any nexus between them and specific action by the
public official makes it difficult to apply existing bribery law. Adequate control of these favors will require upgraded controls. For
example, gifts and sponsored travel might be discouraged by public disclosure. Elections might be better funded by government
grant, and individual campaign contributions being made illegal."
Strong bribery statutes can be an immediate deterrent to misbehavior and a long-term method of inculcating ethical standards.
Because any failure to take action against obvious violations will
quickly undermine confidence, bribery law must be regularly reviewed to cover new forms of improper inducement and must be
supported by adequate enforcement machinery. Perhaps the greatest gap in bribery law at present is the privilege afforded legislators, particularly in Britain. Although historically good reasons
existed for the privilege, it can no longer be justified.
45. State v. Smagula, 39 N.J. Super. 187, 120 A.2d 621 (1956); Commonwealth v. Tonty, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 115 A.2d 833 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1005 (1955). The British and Australian legislation covers payment of bribes
as campaign contributions when it refers to consideration obtained by the official
for himself or for any other person. Secret Commissions Act, 1905, § 4, para. 1
(Austl.); Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34, § 1, para. 1. In
Britain, Lloyd George extolled the sale of honors for campaign funds as a way of
limiting bribery:
In America, the steel trusts supported one political party, and the cotton
people supported another. This placed political parties under the domination of great financial interests and trusts. Here,. . . a man gives L40,000
to the Party and gets a baronetcy. If he comes to the Leader of the Party
and says I subscribe largely to the Party funds, you must do this or that,
we can tell him to go to the devil.
J. DAVIDSON, MEMOIRS OF A CONSERVATIVE 279 (R. James ed. 1969). A Royal Commission in Queensland found corrupt conduct on the part of a Minister for Public
Lands when he solicited a donation to party funds in return for favorable consideration in the grant of a Crown leasehold. ROYAL COMMISSION, ALLEGATIONS OF
CORRUPTION

RELATING TO DEALINGS WITH

CERTAIN

CROWN LEASEHOLDS

IN

129 (1956).
46. The United States has already imposed stringent restrictions and reporting requirements upon individual and corporate contributions and has also provided for federal subsidizing of presidential elections. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441c (1976).
QUEENSLAND
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B.

Conflict of Interest Law

As early as 1789, the Rules of the United States House of Representatives required disqualification of congressmen from voting on
legislation concerning matters in which they had a personal or
pecuniary interest." The prohibition on voting in the British House
of Commons for members with a direct pecuniary interest is embodied in the ruling of Speaker Abbott in 1811: "ITIhis interest
. . . must be a direct pecuniary interest, and separately belonging
to the persons . . . and not in common with the rest of His Majesty's subjects, or on a matter of state policy. 4 8 Later Speakers
have interpreted the ruling narrowly. Similarly, Speakers of the
Australian House of Representatives have emasculated Standing
Order 196, which is almost identical with Speaker Abbott's rul49
ing.
A rule requiring declaration of pecuniary interest or other benefit
when speaking in the House of Commons and when communicating with Ministers and civil servants was adopped in 1974,10 based
on a conviction that a declaration was necessary "because hon.
Members desire to be frank with their fellow Members and it is
sometimes a matter of prudence, in case an hon. Member should
be suspected of unavowed motives."' In practice, this rule was
clearly ineffective because members failed to declare that their
personal pecuniary interests were clearly affected. For this reason,
support grew for a register of Parliamentarians' interest.2
47. House Rule VIII. See HOUSE RULES & MANUAL § 659 (1971). Unless specially excused, Senators were not disqualified in the case of a personal or pecuniary interest because otherwise their states would lose one of only two votes.
Rulings of ineligibility have been rare.

48.
49.

20

PARL. DEB.,

H.C. (1st Ser.) 1012 (1811).

See 105 PARL. DEB. 3380-83 (1923) (Austl.). See also 145 PARL. DEB. 1130
(1934) (Austl.); 17 PARL. DEB., H.R. 2447-49 (1957) (Austl.); 18 PARL. DEB., H.R.
478-79 (1958) (Austl.).
50. 874 PARL. DEE., H.C. (5th ser.) 391-544 (1974); 893 PARL. DEE., H.C. 735804 (5th ser.) (1975). The rule was based on recommendations of SELECT COMM.
ON MEMBERS' INTERESTS (DECLARATION), H.C. PAPER No. 102 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as WILLEY REPORT].
51. 510 PARL. DEB., H.C: (5th ser.) 2040 (1953). A similar rule still exists for
the Australian House of Representatives. 215 PARL. DEE., H.R. 2154 (1951)
(Austl.). No such practice has ever existed in Congress. See K. BRADSHAW & D.
PRING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS 109 (1972).
52. MEMBERS' REPORT, supra note 34, at §§ 22-23. See also SELECT COMM. ON
MEMBERS' INTERESTS (DECLARATION), H.C. PAPER No. 57, app. 10 (1969) (memorandum of Mr. Andrew Roth) [hereinafter cited as STRAUSS REPORT]. For Aus-
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1. Office of Profit
Perhaps the oldest provision of relevance to conflict of interest
is the English concept that those holding an "office of profit"
under the Crown cannot sit in Parliament. The earliest English
provisions were simply an attempt by the House of Commons in
the early seventeenth century to assert its privileges, and thus
judges were excluded from being members of the Commons because they were associated with the Lords. From the time of the
Restoration in 1660, the aim was to exclude from Parliament those
who might be servile to the Crown, which was attempting to use
the considerable patronage at its disposal to win support for its
policies. 3 The notion of office of profit was placed on a firm statutory basis by the Statute of Anne of 1707. 11 The concept was supported for the following reasons: to insulate certain offices, e.g.,
judiciary, civil servants, members of public authorities, from being
held by Members of Parliament engaged in political controversy;
to maintain the principle of Ministerial responsibility by preventing civil servants, for whose decisions a Minister is responsible,
from becoming Members of Parliament themselves; to eliminate
the opportunity for Members of Parliament to pursue self-interest;
and, to ensure that Parliamentarians devote their time to their
Parliamentary duties. 5
A variety of cases have arisen under the 1707 Act which have
been considered by the House of Commons rather than the
courts." Over the years certain office holders such as the Postmaster General were statutorily excluded from the disqualification. In
addition, specific acts of indemnity have been necessary to save
tralia see JOINT COMM. ON PECUNIARY INTERESTS OF MEMBERS, 70 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as RIORDAN EVIDENCE].
53. The Managers of the Commons in Conference said in 1706: "A total repeal
of that provision would admit such an unlimited number of officers to sit in their
house, as might destroy the free and impartial proceedings in Parliament, and
endanger the liberties of the Commons of England." 3 H. HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 193 (1863).
54.

6 Anne, c. 41 (1707).
See T. ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND
PARLIAMENT 209-10 (17th ed. 1964).

55.

56.

24

HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND

USAGE OF

225 (2d ed. 1937). Viscount Palmerston

accepted the honorary office of Constable of Dover Castle and Lord Warden of
the Cinque Ports in 1861 for which a salary payable by the Crown had been
withdrawn although the warrant granted the incumbent wrecks, fees, rewards,
and commodities. It was decided that a new writ should issue for Palmerston's
seat.
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particular M.P.'s from possible penal consequences since under
the statute, common informers could sue Members in breach of the
Act. 57 With the growth of the state, the legislation developed a wide
but uncertain ambit. To reduce statutory uncertainty and to avoid
trivial appointments falling within the purview of the statute, Britain enacted the House of Commons Disqualification Act of 1957,
which lists all disqualifying offices by schedule, alterable by statutory order." In addition, the Act abolished monetary penalties and
empowered the Commons to declare that a particular disqualification be disregarded.
The statutory counterpart to the British office of profit concept
in the United States is article 1, section 6 of the Constitution.
Article 1, section 6 provides that during a term of office, congressmen may not hold any other federal office, and upon resignation,
they may not be appointed to any federal office which was created
or whose salaries were increased during the preceding term of Congress. The clause was designed by the framers to maintain the
separation of powers doctrine and to avoid a situation in the
United States comparable to the compromise of Parliamentarians
by the British Crown. 9
The British office of profit concept was adopted in Australia at
both the state and national level. Thus, section 44 of the Australian Constitution provides: "Any person who . . (iv) Holds any
office of profit under the Crown . . . shall be incapable of being
chosen or if sitting as a senator or a member of the House of
Representatives." The section also excludes ministerial appointments. Section 45 declares that if a Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives becomes subject to section 44, his seat
thereupon becomes vacant. Monetary penalties for breach of the
57. E.g., Arthur Jenkins Indemnity Act, 1941, 5 Geo. 6, c. 1.
58. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 20. The present version is House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1975, c. 24.
59. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 379-82 (M. Farrand ed.
1911); 2 id. at 180; THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Madison). See also Atkins v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1070, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). In 1971 an antiwar group attempted to invoke the clause against members of Congress in the
Armed Forces Reserve. The Supreme Court ultimately denied the group standing,
however. A favorable decision would have reduced to some extent the identification which some members of Congress have with the military-a non-pecuniary
conflict of interest. See Reservists Comm. to Stop War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833
(D.D.C. 1971), affl'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 418
U.S. 208 (1974). Earlier examples are mentioned in 1 A. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, § § 487-506 (1935).
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section have recently been reduced, and are now limited to $200
unless a person continues to sit after having been served with the
originating process." Australia has witnessed several court cases
involving office of profit, and Parliamentarians assuming even relatively minor and innocuous positions have been disqualified." At
the state level, consideration is being given to listing in the various
state constitutions the offices for which a member may be disqualified. 2 Substantial barriers exist to amending the Australian Constitution although nothing in section 47 prevents the national Parliament from excluding the courts and dealing with possible disqualifications internally. 3
2. Government Contractors
A 1782 Act regulating government contractors in Britain was
based upon the same rationale as the legislation disqualifying individuals holding an office of profit, namely, to ensure that the independence of M.P.'s would not be undermined by the Crown's allocation of government business. The Act of 1782 provided that any
person who either directly or indirectly held for his own use or
benefit, in whole or in part, any "contract, agreement, or commission" with any person or persons for or on account of the public
service, was incapable of being elected to, or of sitting or voting in
the House of Commons. 4 The Act imposed a very heavy penalty
60. Common Informers (Parliamentary Disqualification) Act, 1975, c. 28
(Austl.). Parliamentary power to take this action comes from section 47 of the
Australian Constitution.
61. E.g., In re The Warrego Election Petition (Bowman v. Hood), 9 Queensl.
L.J. 272 (1899). Cf. Clydesdale v. Hughes, 51 C.L.R. 518 (1934) (Seat on Lotteries
Commission). Recent "office of profit" cases in Queensland involved an M.P.
accepting briefs as a barrister for the Crown and various M.P.s who had been
appointed by the government to bodies such as a school board. See Legislative
Assembly and Another Act Amendment Act, 1978, c. 5 (Queensl.).
62. WESTERN AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMM., DISQUALIFICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP OF PARLIAMENT: OFFICES OF PROFIT UNDER THE CROWN AND GOVERNMENT

CONTRACTS

(1971).

63. An example was the "Gair affair" in 1974. See 48 AusTL. L.J. 221 (1974).
64. The House of Commons (Disqualification) Act, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 45, §

1. See also 41 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1801). The preamble to 22 Geo. 3, c. 45 reads, "For
further securing the Freedom and Independence of Parliament." In In re Samuel,
[1913] A.C. 514, 524, Viscount Haldane, L.C. for the Privy Council, said: "This

Act of Parliament itself declares that it was made to preserve the freedom and
independence of Parliament; and the mischief guarded against is the sapping of

that freedom and independence by members being admitted to profitable contracts."
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of £500 for every day on which a disqualified person sat or voted
in the House. 5 After 1931, the disqualification extended "only to
contracts, agreements, or commissions for the furnishing or providing of money to be remitted abroad or wares and merchandise to
be used or employed in the service of the public."6 Section 3 of the
original Act provided that it did not extend to incorporated trading
companies where the contract was made for the general benefit of
the company.
Both the Commons and the Courts have attempted to limit the
effect of the 1782 Act. In 1855, a Select Committee of the Commons
determined that a Member (Baron Rothschild) who lent money to
the government was not in violation of the provision." The Court
of Common Pleas in Royse v. Birley" held that a Member was not
disqualified, although the firm in which he was a partner had
supplied goods for the public service of India. The goods were
considered a "public service" because the contract was completely
executed before the election, though the firm had not been paid as
of that date. The Member's firm also had once supplied goods of
small value for Broadmoor, since the firm did not know that it was
a state lunatic asylum. Another instance of a narrow construction
of the Act was the case of Tranton v. Astor,6" which held that Hon.
Waldorf Astor, sole proprietor of the London Observer, was not
disqualified as an M.P. because of specific government advertising
placed in that newspaper relating to war recruiting and war loans.
Justice Low, no doubt influenced by the fact that the case was
brought by a common informer claiming £29,000 for breach of the
Act, applied Royse v. Birley to determine that the contract was
65. House of Commons (Disqualification) Act, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 45, § 9.
66. House of Commons Disqualification (Declaration of Law) Act, 1931, 21
Geo. 5, c. 13.
67.

T.

ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES,

PROCEEDINGS AND

USAGE OF

214 (14th ed. 1946).
68. L.R. 4 C.P. 296 (1869). Judge Willes with whom Chief Justice Bovill
agreed, said that section I of the legislation "refers to the case of a man having a
contract under which he is to derive some future benefit from dealing with the
government, in respect of which they might control him; as, for instance, by
directing their officers not to look too closely to the sort of goods he sent in, or
the like." Id. at 311-12. Justice Montague Smith said: "[Tihe legislature intended it to apply only to contracts of a continuing nature, such as contracts for
the building of works, and contracts for a recurring supply of goods, though I do
not say that a contract for a single supply of goods is not within the terms which
are used." Id. at 317.
PARLIAMENT

69.

33 TASM. L.R. 383 (1917).
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executed at the time the Member was sitting and voting. 0 He also
held that the contract was with an independent contractor acting
for the government, and not with the government itself. In the
course of the judgment, Justice Low made the following remarks:
"[S]uch casual or transient transactions are not the kind of contracts covered by these statutes, but what are meant to be covered
are contracts of a more permanent or continuing and lasting character . . . . -.,In 1957, the judicial disqualification was abolished
completely and the Commons was left to deal with disqualifications as a matter of privilege, following the recommendation of a
Select Committee. In none of the cases over the years where the
legislation was invoked had any suggestion of corruption been
made.72
By Act of Congress in 1808, it became an offense for a member
of Congress "directly or indirectly . . . [to] undertake, execute,
hold or enjoy, in the whole or in part, any contract or agreement
hereafter to be made or entered into" by the United States or any
of its agencies. Like the British statute, the language in the
United States Act was broad, and in an early case it was applied
to congressmen who had become assistant counsel to the Attorneys
General of the United States.74 United States v. Dietrich75 involved
a person who became a Senator while holding a contract of rental
of a post office; the court held that the statute had to apply in this
context with full vigor even though the contract was fairly obtained
and reasonable in its terms. The court reasoned that it was advantageous to the United States:
70. Although Royse v. Birley, L.R. 4 C.P. 296 (1869), involved a contract
which had been executed at the time of the election.
71. 33 TASM. L.R. at 386. Cf. In re Grenville Provincial Election (Payne v.
Ferguson), 56 D.L.R. 122 (1920) (Canadian case holding that buying supporters
dinner, tipping a band, and controlling a printing company that did ballot work
does not disqualify candidate).
72. SELECT COMM. ON HOUSE OF COMMONS DISQUALIFICATION BILL, CMD No. 349
(1956) Memorandum Submitted by the Clerk of the House of Commons § 6. The

Committee also highlighted the inconsistencies in the legislation. For example,
contracts of service were excluded though in some cases they are covered by the
office of profit doctrine. Thus a person might be disqualified for selling a little
furniture to the government, but not for erecting a building.
73. Act of April 21, 1808, ch. 48, 2 Stat. 484 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
431 (1976)). Exemptions were gradually grafted onto the provision, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 433 (1976).

74. Op. Att'y Gen. 574 (H. Gilpin ed. 1841). See also 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 47 (June
1, 1842) (partnership of which Congressman was partner).

75.

126 F. 671 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904).
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to preserve the independence of the legislative and executive
branches of the Government, and to free each from that influence
which might come to be exerted over it by the other if the officers
of the executive branch, acting on behalf of the government, could
freely contract with members of and delegates to Congress. The
purpose of the statute is to effectually close the door to the temptation which is incident to contractual relations between the government and members of Congress. 6
Yet in United States v. McMillan,77 a United States district court
held that an acquittal was warranted for a defendant who held a
federal lease while he was a congressman, given that it was an
ordinary transaction and that he had not concealed his position,
had evinced no criminal intent, and was a person of high honor.',
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,
contributions from a government contractor are now prohibited to
any political party or candidate for federal office.7
The Australian Constitution provides that a person "shall be
incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of
the House of Representatives" if he "[h]as any direct or indirect
pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the
Commonwealth other than as a member and in common with the
other members of an incorporated company consisting of more
than twenty-five persons. 0 The section was not invoked until 1975

76. Id.at 673.
77. 114 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1953).
78. The court pointed out that otherwise, Congressmen holding government
bonds or securities would be in violation. Id. at 642.
79. The statute makes unlawful the making of a contribution by any person
"who enters into any contract with the United States or any department or agency
thereof either for the rendition of personal services or furnishing any material,
supplies, or equipment to the United States ...or for selling any land or building
to the United States ... if payment for the performance of such contract ... is
to be made in whole or in part from funds appropriated by the Congress, at any
time between the commencement of negotiations for and the later of (A) the
completion of performance under; or (B) the termination of negotiations ......
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C. §
441c(a)(1) (1976).
80. Ausm. CONST. § 44(v). Similar provisions in Australian state constitutions
have been considered by the courts but have never been held to disqualify a
member of Parliament. Most of the decisions seem justified in terms of legislative
purpose. See Hobler v. Jones, [19591 Queensl. 609 (M.P. holding ordinary government lease); Proudfoot v. Proctor, 8 N.S.W.L.R. 459 (1887) (M.P. guarantor
and assignee of contract). But see Miles v. McIlwraith, 8 App. Cas. 120 (1883) (a
Queensland M.P., whose brother's firm chartered a ship to the government on
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when the case of a Senator whose family company had certain
contracts with the Australian public service was referred to the
Court of Disputed Returns.' The Court effectively emasculated
the provision as it related to conflict of interest situations. It held
that the provision does not apply to casual and transient contracts.
To be covered, a contract must be one in which the government
82
could influence the contractor in his Parliamentary duties.
3.

Relevance of Old Law

The long-standing provisions regarding office of profit and government contractors are of limited application in present conditions. Nevertheless, they have some remaining value: for legislators might "pull their punches" if they thought that by attacking
the Executive they might lose some type of government business
or that they might not benefit from patronage in part-time appointments to government commissions or appointed agencies.
Moreover, in the absence of such provisions, legislators might seek
favors from the Executive, seeking to bnefit themselves improperly. The provisions do not necessarily lead to disqualification,
however; the power to relieve an official from the consequences of
a minor breach should be retained in the provisions. The determinations of what activities render an official subject to reprimand,
discipline, or ultimately disqualification should be initially made
in an atmosphere removed from partisan considerations. 83 Little
behalf of the owners, the M.P. being part-owner of the ship, was not disqualified).
See also Tasmanian Members' Case, 6 AusTL. L.J. 322, 365 (1933) (M.P.s borrowed from government bank and received loans under veterans' repatriation

scheme prior to election).
81. 132 C.L.R. 270 (1975).
82. Id. at 280. Chief Justice Barwick, said that the purpose of the section was
to prevent the Crown suborning Parliamentarians. Id. at 278-79. This is historically inaccurate because the Constitutional Conventions were equally concerned
with preventing Parliamentarians from using their elected office for personal gain.
See Hammond, A Comment on the Webster Case, 3 MONASH L.REv. 91, 97 (1976).
Moreover, Barwick's suggestion, 132 C.L.R. at 287, that a shareholder in a company does not necessarily have a pecuniary interest in any agreement between the
company and the public service, is inconsistent with the wide interpretation of
pecuniary interest in English decisions. E.g., Brown v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 119561 2 Q.B. 369. The suggestion also flies in the face of Ausm. CONST. §
44(v), which expressly excludes from the application of the provision shareholders
in companies consisting of more than 25 members. Clearly, the exclusion was
intended to prevent the corporate form from being used to avoid the constitu-

tional provision.
83.

Evans, Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliamentunder the Austra-
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evidence exists to support private actions for penalties by common
informers. In serious cases, however, citizens should have the right
to a court declaration that a legislator is disqualified where, for
political reasons, the legislature itself is not prepared to act.
The older law yields a rich harvest of general principles governing the behavior of legislators and public officers, extending beyond offices of profit and government contractors. Some of the
older principles are somewhat dated: party political government
means that an M.P. in Britain or Australia may bind himself before election to follow the party line so that he does not serve the
public as a whole as required by the old cases.8 Nevertheless,
many common law duties of M.P.'s are still pertinent: the duty to
act according to judgment and conscience, without the influence
of pecuniary considerations; the duty to act honestly; the duty to
represent the needs and concerns of constituents; the duty not to
fetter by pecuniary consideration their obligation of due watchfulness, criticism and censure of the Executive; the duty not to put
themselves in a position of temptation; and the duty not to pursue
private advantage." The duties on public officers flowing from
their position as trustees to the public include the duty to perform
functions honestly, the duty to refrain from activities which interfere with the proper discharge of their functions, and the duty not
to place themselves in a position where public duty conflicts with
private interest."s
IV.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Three broad approaches have been adopted in the last decade
to deal with conflict of interest problems: disclosure, regulation,
and divestiture. Under the first approach, legislators and public
officers would be required to disclose their interests to allow a
judgment on whether their public duty and private interests conflict. Under the second approach, the behavior of public officials
lian Constitution, 49 Ausm. L.J. 464 (1975). One specific problem in the case of
contracts is whether a legislator should be considered as having an interest
through a shareholding in the contracting company. Control, involvement and
benefit appear to be the relevant parameters.
84. Osborne v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1909] 1 Ch. 163, 18687, 196-97.
85. The King v. Boston, 33 C.L.R. 386, 393, 399-400 (1923); Horne v. Barber,
27 C.L.R. 494, 500-01 (1920); Wilkinson v. Osborne, 21 C.L.R. 89, 98-99 (1915);
Attorney-General of Ceylon v. De Livera, [1963] A.C. 103, 125; Egerton v.
Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 423 (1853).
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would be regulated so that such conflicts are obviated. Under the
last approach, the public official would be required to dispose of
those interests which could conceivably conflict with his public
duty. Supporting each approach is a variety of mechanisms including unenforceable codes of conduct, internal discipline, and criminal sanction.
The conflict of interest measures which have been adopted are
justified on the ground of protection of public confidence." Wellpublicized examples in recent times of conflicts of interests have
generated a crisis of confidence in representative institutions
which can only be assuaged by positive action.88 The question of
whether these particular measures are restoring public confidence
remains undetermined. Requiring legislators to disclose their private pecuniary interests may simply convince some members of
the public that their worst fears are justified. The public now has
higher expectations of legislators and public officials and the continued vitality of liberal democracy requires a reaffirmation that
public duty is paramount to the pursuit of private interests.
A.

Disclosure

Systematic disclosure by register on the part of legislators and
public servants of their financial interests is the lynchpin of modern conflict of interest regulation in the three countries considered.
It is preferred to divestiture since many persons would avoid public
office if it meant abandonment of business involvements and personal investments. The advantages accruing from public financial
disclosure include the following: it will increase public confidence
in government; it will demonstrate the high level of integrity of the
vast majority of government officials; it will deter conflicts of inter86.

63 AM. JuR.

2D,

Public Officers and Employees §§ 275-83 (1972); Finn,

Public Officers: Some PersonalLiabilities,51 AusTL. L.J. 313 (1977). See also The
Queen v. Llewellyn-Jones, [19671 3 All E.R. 225, 228-29; The King v. Jones,

[19461 Vict. L.R. 300 (misbehavior in public office); A. DIcEY, THE LAW

OF THE

CONSTITrrION 327 (10th ed. 1959); 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF
GREAT BRITAIN, THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE COMMONWEALTH 153 (6th ed. 1946).
87. See generally P. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 98-100 (1952); J. KIRBY,
CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST

(1970).

88. Recent examples are the case of Maudling, Cordle, and Roberts in Britain,
see MEMBERS' REPORT, supra note 34; South Korean bribes in the U.S.,
ECONOMIST, June 25, 1977, at 39; and the Victorian lands case in Australia,
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN LAND PURCHASES BY THE HOUSING
COMMISSION AND QUESTIONS ARISING THEREFROM, VICT. PARLIAMENTARY PAPER No.

6 (1978).
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est because officials will realize that their actions will be scrutinized; it will deter persons who should not be entering public service from doing so; and finally, the performance of public officials
will be more readily ascertainable.8 9

A public register now has wide acceptance among legislators as
a means of achieving these aims. Both Britain and the United
States have a register, and the matter remains under consideration
in Australia. Legislators must expect thorough public scrutiny in
the performance of their public duties. Moreover, public financial
disclosure assists enforcement because private citizens and the
press will be able to scrutinize legislators when they have the
means.
It is argued that greater financial disclosure has significant
drawbacks." For example, it is arguably unfair to impose heavy
reporting burdens on the honest majority because of the behavior
of a minority. It has also been suggested that many conflict of
interest situations are a gray area and thus intrusion into an individual's privacy and the threat of criminal sanctions cannot be
justified. A further argument questions whether certain public officials should be subject to such requirements when similar disclosure requirements do not exist for other public officials or private
sector officials.' The ease of evasion and the failure to highlight
89. E.g., SENATE COMM. ON GovERNMENTAL AFFAIRS & PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, PUBuc OFFICIALS INTEGRITY Aar OF 1977, S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22
(1977).
90. E.g., COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GovRNmENT RULES OF CONDUCT, CMND. No.
5636, § 56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as REDCLiFFE-MAUD REPORT]; STRAUSS REPORT
supra note 52, at §§70-78.

91. The American courts have considered whether public disclosure is an
inequitable imposition on higher public officials when others need not disclose.
In Kenny v. Byrne, 144 N.J. Super. 243, 365 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 75
N.J. 458, 383 A.2d 428 (1978), the court rejected the contention that an executive
order mandating disclosure violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it was applicable only to a limited group of state officials.
The clause was not offended by a mere difference in treatment. See Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (some invidious discrimination would have to be
shown); Morey v. David, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). The difference in treatment was
not without a reasonable basis because the higher officials were more involved in
decision-making than lower officials and hende more likely to become involved
in conflicts of interest. Kenny v. Byrne, 365 A.2d at 219. See Chamberlin v.
Missouri Elections Comm'n, 540 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1976). Cf. Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, (state employees unsuccessfully challenged financial disclosure requirements), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1059
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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crucial interests are other objections to systematic disclosure.
Although legislative committees in Britain, the United States,
and Australia have considered that for legislators the privacy argument is overridden by other considerations,92 it remains the strongest argument against public financial disclosure. It is fair to add,
however, that the Parliamentary registers suggested for Britain
and Australia are such that the privacy of Members is hardly
affected. United States courts have held that the privacy of legislators which is invaded by financial disclosure is not within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy which attaches to personal and family matters.9" Thus the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Kenny v. Byrne" upheld a law requiring financial disclosure of
certain appointed officials in the executive branch. Quoting from
an earlier lower court decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court set
out a convincing justification for ignoring privacy:
By accepting public employment an individual steps from the category of a purely private citizen to that of a public citizen. And in
that transition he must of necessity subordinate his private rights
to the extent that they may compete or conflict with the superior
right of the public to achieve honest and efficient government.95
Similarly, in Klaus v. Minnesota State Ethics Commission," the
92. E.g., HOUSE COMM'N ON ADmINISTRATivE RE VIEw, FNANmCIA ETHics, H.R.
Doc. No. 73, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OBEY REPORT];
RiORDAN REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; Wiu y REPORT, supra note 50, at § 10.
93. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976); but note that some judges
throw doubt on laws requiring public disclosure of an official's financial position
in obiter remarks. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal.3d
259, 263-68, 466 P.2d 225, 228-32, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-8 (1970). There is also the
argument that disclosure might be in violation of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Disclosure would, however, seem clearly to fall within
the justification of being generally neutral, not directed at a selected group inherently suspect of criminal activities, and within a regulatory rather than criminal
framework. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
94. 144 N.J. Super. 243, 365 A.2d 211, (App. Div. 1976), aJJ'd, 75 N.J. 458,
383 A.2d 428 (1976).
95. Id. at 252, 365 A.2d at 216, (quoting Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 N.J. Super.
250, 262, 356 A.2d 35, 42 (App. Div. 1976)).
96. 309 Minn. 430, 244 N.W.2d 672 (1976). See also Illinois State Employees
Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058
(1974); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 336 A.2d 97 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 562, 391
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Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a disclosure statute for candidates for the state legislature. The Court remarked that when a
person stands as a candidate, he subjects himself to close scrutiny.9 7
Privacy becomes a more compelling objection to a public register
if a legislator must register the interests of his spouse and children.
A legislator may implicitly consent to disclose by virtue of seeking
public office, but the same can hardly be said for his spouse and
immediate family. The very practical issue of what punishment
can be imposed on a legislator if a spouse refuses to divulge to him
the necessary information must also be explored. For these reasons
a British M.P. need not register the independently-held interests
of his spouse or children. The Riordan Report in Australia found
that Parliamentarians should register only those interests of their
spouse or children of which they were aware. 98
Powerful arguments do exist, however, in favor of requiring disclosure by a legislator of the interests of his spouse and immediate
family. First, family assets are frequently intermingled so that it
is unrealistic to treat them separately. Second, a person could
circumvent disclosure requirements applying only to himself by
conveying interests or directing income or gifts to his spouse. Finally, a person can be influenced by the interests of his family as
well as by his own interests. For these reasons, congressmen and
senators in the United States must publicly disclose certain
interests of their spouses.
1. The British Parliamentary Register
Because of the number of M.P.'s who were paid either as consultants or by public relations firms, it was suggested that the
House of Commons adopt a register of Parliamentarians' interests.
N.Y.S. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modified, 58 App. Div. 2d 136, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 186
(1977); Fritz v. Gordon, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), appealdismissed,
417 U.S. 902 (1974).
97. 309 Minn. at 436, 244 N.W.2d at 676.
98. Interests are said to be constructively controlled if enhancement would
benefit the person reporting. OBEY REPORT, supranote 92, at 7. Similar provisions
have been upheld at the state level, e.g., County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal.
3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974); Montgomery County v. Walsh,
274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 97 (1975); Fritz v. Gordon, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911
(1974), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974). Contra, Carmel-By-The-Sea v.
Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 255, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). See also Dwyer v.
Kahn, 88 Misc. 2d 73, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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The Strauss Committee in 1969 determined that a register would
be ineffective, and for that reason recommended instead a stronger
form of ad hoc declaration by Members applying to debate, question time, or correspondence with Ministers and civil servants."
Yet by 1974, following several notable improprieties by Members
of Parliament, pressure for a register was strong enough to convince the Willey Committee, and ultimately the Commons itself,
of the need for a register.""0
The purpose of the Register as adopted is to provide information
on any pecuniary interest or other material benefit which a Member may receive which might be thought to affect his conduct as a
Member or influence his actions, speeches or vote in Parliament.
Members must register their private interests under nine headings:
(1) remunerated directorships of companies, public or private;
(2) remunerated employments or offices;
(3) remunerated trades, professions or vocations;
(4) the names of clients when the interest referred to above
includes personal services by the Member which arise out of
or are related in any manner to his membership of the House;
(5) financial sponsorships, (a) as a parliamentary candidate
where to the knowledge of the Member the sponsorship in any
case exceeds 25 per cent of the candidate's election expenses,
or (b) as a Member of Parliament, by any person or organisation, stating whether any such sponsorship includes any payment to the Member or any material benefit or advantage
direct or indirect;
(6) overseas visits relating to or arising out of membership of
the House where the cost of any such visit has not been wholly
borne by the Member or by public funds;
(7) any payments or any material benefits or advantages received from or on behalf of foreign Governments, organisations or persons;
99. STRAUSS REPORT, supra note 52, at §§ 76, 78. The Liberal Party began a
voluntary register for its M.P.s in 1967. See generally Vijay, The Declarationof
Interests by M.P.s:An Analysis of the CurrentCampaignfor Reform, 44 PoUTICAL

Q. 478 (1973).
100. WILLEY REPORT, supra note 50, at §§ 9-11. The previous year a Royal
Commission recommended a local authority register. REDCLIPEE-MAUD REPORT,
supra note 90, at §§ 55-64.
101. T. ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS, AND USAGE OF
PARLIAMENT 1087-88 (19th ed. 1976).
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(8) land and property of substantial value or from which a
substantial income is derived;
(9) the names of companies or other bodies in which the Member has, to his knowledge, either himself or with or on behalf
of his spouse or infant children, a beneficial interest in shareholdings of a nominal value greater than one-hundredth of the
issued share capital.'0 '
No reference is made in the Register to individual headings under
which a Member has nothing to register. As a result of the wide
exemption for interests held by Members' spouses and children,
many entries read simply "Nil Return." The actual form of the
British register is of a Parliamentary paper, printed each session
and available for sale to the public. 02 The master copy held by the
Registrar 0 3 is available to the public and is regularly updated by
members within four weeks of a change in registered interests. The
responsibility for registering falls upon the Members alone, although in cases of doubt a Select Committee on the Register of
Members' Interests, established each session to act in a supervisory role, may become involved if necessary. Enforcement of the
requirement to register lies ultimately in the House's penal jurisdiction to deal with contempt.
2.

Congressional Disclosure

Existing disclosure provisions governing federal officials in the
United States were recently under review, and various amendments have been made by the Congress."" A major criticism was
that existing provisions were not uniformly applied. They did not
cover the highest officials such as the President or Vice-President,
and while public disclosure was necessary for members of the Congress, confidential disclosure was sufficient for officials in the Executive branch. Furthermore, congressional disclosure has been
backed only by the sanctions Congress has been willing to impose
upon itself.
Moves for financial disclosure by members of Congress began in
102. E.g., MEMBERS' INTERESTS: REGISTER AS ON 1 NOVEMBER 1975 CMND. No.
699 (1975).
103. The Registrar is a member of the Clerk's Department of the Commons.
104. See Public Officials IntegrityAct of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflicts of Interest Matters: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conflict of Interest
Hearings.I
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the early 1950s, but it was only after the Bobby Baker and Dodd
scandals that both the House and the Senate in 1968 passed resolutions requiring some form of disclosure. Both resolutions were
strengthened in 1977.05 For example, the House provisions had
been vague in important areas: property dealings were excluded;
no requirement was included to list shareholdings, even of corporations doing substantial business with the government; and the
sources of honoraria to congressmen did not have to be stated. The
Obey Committee concluded that the provisions "are perhaps now
better known for what they did not require than for what they
'0 6
cause to be disclosed.'
On March 2, 1977, the House of Representatives amended Rule
44.107 Congressmen and their staff must now publicly disclose:
1. Income and honoraria received during the preceding calendar
year aggregating $100 or more in value, except that the amount of
dividends and the like need be indicated only by categories (not
more than $1,000, $1,000-$2,500, etc.);
2. Gifts from any source, transportation, lodging, food or entertainment, worth more than $250 or all other gifts worth more than
$100 except those from a relative, personal hospitality or those worth
less than $35; reimbursements from a single source aggregating $250
or more in value;
3. The identity and category of value of any property held in a
trade or business or for investment or the production of income
which has a fair market value exceeding $1,000;
4. The identity and category of value of the total liabilities owed
to any creditor other than a relative which exceed $10,000 at any
time during the preceding calendar year excluding mortgages on a
personal residence or motor vehicle, household furniture or appliances;
5. The description, category of value and date of any transaction
with anyone other than a spouse or dependent child during the
preceding year involving securities or real property other than personal residences;
6. The identity of positions with corporations, businesses, and
other organizations except religious, social fraternal, or political entities or for positions solely of an honorary nature;
7. Arrangements for future employment and existing links with
previous employers;' °
OBEY REPORT, supra note 92, at 3.
106. H.R. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 CONG. REc. H1614 (daily ed.
Mar. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Res. 287].

105.

107. Id.

108. The categories are as follows: Not more than $5,000; $5,000-$15,000;
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As indicated, there is no need to specify the actual amount or value
of some terms. All that is necessary is the category into which they
fall. The rationale for categorizing the amount rather than specifying it is that the interest rather than the specific dollar amount is
sufficient information upon which to determine the existence of
conflicts of interest.
Reports must also contain information about a spouse's earned
income exceeding $1,000, details about investment income, gifts
and reimbursements which are not received independently of the
spouse's relationship, and items listed under points three to five
above other than items (i) which the reporting individual certifies
represent the spouse or dependent child's sole financial interest or
responsibility and which the reporting individual has no knowledge of, (ii) which are not in any way derived from activities of the
reporting individual, and (iii) from which the reporting individual
neither derives nor expects to derive any financial or economic
benefit.0 9 Members of Congress and their staffs must report the
information listed above with respect to income from a trust or
other financial arrangement from which income is received by, or
in which a beneficial interest is held by the settlor, his spouse or
dependent child. This disclosure requirement does not apply, however, to qualified blind trusts or trusts which were not created by
the settlor, his spouse or dependent child and if they have no
knowledge of the holdings or sources of income of the trust.' ' Matters thus disclosed are public records but may not be obtained or
used for commercial purposes other than news."'
The United States congressional requirements go well beyond
the British House of Commons register where Members need only
disclose the source of any remuneration or benefits, and are not
required to disclose, even within broad categories, the amount of
the benefit. Members are further required only to state the general
nature of their property interest rather than a detailed list of holdings. In addition, spouses' and children's interests need not be
disclosed at all under the British system. It is also noteworthy that
the reporting requirements adopted by the United States Congress
have been further strengthened by the enactment of a provision of
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, which
$15,000-$50,000; $50,000-$100,000; $100,000-$250,000; greater than $250,000.
109. H.R. Res. 287, supra note 106 at H1614 (1977).
110. The manner in which blind trusts can be used to avoid these reporting
requirements is discussed in text accompanying notes 165-168.
111. H.R. Res. 287, supra note 106 at H1614.
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impose dollar limitations upon receipt of honoraria by elected or
appointed federal officials. Under the Act, no single honorarium
may be accepted which exceeds $2,000 plus actual travel and subsistence expenses, and honoraria may not exceed $25,000 in the
12
aggregate for any calendar year. 1
3.

Executive Disclosure

Before 1978, limited non-public disclosure was required for
United States executive branch agency heads, presidential appointees in the Executive Office of the President who are not subordinate to an agency head, and all full-time members of committees, boards, or commissions appointed by the President. 3 In addition, senior public officials engaged in activities such as contracting and procurement, the administration of grants and subsidies, and regulating or auditing private industry were required to
disclose those activities to their respective agency heads."' Monitoring by the United States Comptroller General confirms that
those financial disclosure provisions for the Executive did not operate satisfactorily. Agencies administering the rules either were not
sufficiently diligent or had failed to resolve potential conflicts and
numerous instances were encountered in which the ownership of
stock in corporations by public officials might conflict with their
public duty." 5 The Comptroller General concluded that a real need
existed for an Office of Ethics which could give whole-hearted
attention to the enforcement and compliance with disclosure law
in the executive branch. President Carter went beyond existing
legal provisions regarding his own appointees by requiring them to
make financial disclosures which may become public."' Many
state governments in the United States now have some form of
public financial disclosure for state executive officials." 7
112. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, §112(2), 2 U.S.C.
§441; (1976).
113. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 591 (1968). At least one recent statute
requires public disclosure. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, §522,
42 U.S.C. § 6392 (1976).
114. 5 C.F.R. 735, (1978).
115. Conflict of Interest Hearings, supra note 104, at 818-74 (statement of
Comptroller General). See also Conflict of Interest in RegulatoryAgencies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
116. Ethics Statement, 35 CONG. Q., 57 (1977).
117. OBEY REPORT, supra note 92, at 4; See, e.g., Evans v. Carey, 53 App. Div.
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The Ethics in Government Act requires public disclosure by the
President, the Vice-President, candidates for these positions, certain Presidential appointees requiring the advice and consent of
the Senate, senior members of the executive branch and armed
forces, and other employees in the executive branch who are excepted from the Civil Services because of the confidential or policymaking character of their position unless a blind trust is used.",
The Director of the Office of Government Ethics may exempt these
officials from the disclosure requirements."' The interests which
must be disclosed are identical to those which members and staff
of the Congress must disclose, except that those in the executive
must also list from whom and how they earned amounts in excess
of $5,000 in any of the two calendar years prior to that in which
they filed their first report.2 0 Reports must be filed by reporting
individuals with their agencies, and some reports must then be
2
transmitted to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics.' '
If an official does not comply with applicable laws and regulations
the Ethics Office can require him to divest himself of the interest,
establish a blind trust, or resign.'22 Those government employees
not in the above categories might be obliged to make confidential
disclosure. '
Ministers in Britain who are Members of the Commons must
disclose their financial interests publicly. Both the British and
Australian cabinets require their Ministers to declare their interests in matters under discussion. 121 In addition, recent Australian
Prime Ministers have required their Ministers to prepare a private
written statement of their various financial interests.2 5 By force of
law, British and Australian civil servants are now required to dis2
close to superiors any interest in matters under consideration.'

109, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1976), affl'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E. 2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.
2d 393 (1976).
118. Ethics in Government Act § 201(a)-(f), 5 U.S.C.A. app. I § 201(a)-(f),
(1978-79 Supp.).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 202(a).
121. Id. § 122. Id. § 206.
122. Id. § 206.
123. Id. § 207.
124. 496 PARL. DEB., H.C. 702-03 (1952). For Australia, see 54 PARL. DEB.,
H.R. 593 (1967) (Austl.); RioRmD EVIDENCE, supra note 52, at 403, 633.
125. RIoRDAN EVIDENCE, supra note 52, at 619-20. For Australia, see Letter
from Prime Minister to Ministers, Aug. 16, 1977, 106 PAmL. DEB., H.R. 10 (1977)
(Austl.) [hereinafter cited as P.M.'s Letter].
126. For Britain, see SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 124, 135. For Aus-
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Members of the boards of the nationalized industries and government agencies are often statutorily required to declare any interest
in matters under consideration, and may be disqualified from taking part in the deliberations and decision if any such interest
exists.'27 British and Australian corporate law makes the same
requirement, of government appointees to the boards of ordinary
corporations in which the government holds shares.'
Members of only a few government agencies in Britain and Australia must publicly disclose their interests when the appearance
of impartiality is of paramount importance.'29 Some moves in Australia are now being made to have a public register for senior public
servants and members of government agencies, and for other persons in sensitive areas such as purchasing, allocating grants, and
awarding contracts. Such persons arguably possess a greater degree of power, influence, and initiative in decision-making than
back-bench M.P.'s.'30 A Royal Commission in Britain, however,
tralia, see PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD, DRAFT GUIDELINES
MONWEALTH

PUBLIC

SERVANTS

ON OFFICIAL CONDUCT OF COM-

§ 3.5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as

DRAFT

GUMELINES]; RIORDIAN REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.

127. E.g., Broadcasting and Television Act, 1942-1974, § 38 (Austl.), Iron and
Steel Act, 1975, c. 64, § 4, sched. 1.
128.

H. FORD, PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY LAW 352-53 (1976), GORE-BROWN ON

§§ 27-16 to 27-20 (43d ed. 1977).
129. When the National Enterprise Board was established in Britain, it was
decided that board members should annually disclose in a manner similar to the
Commons register because of the Board's important position in making loans to
private corporatons and acting as the holding corporation for some of the government's commercial interests. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68 § 1(8), (3), sched.2. See
also id. at § 13, sched. 1. In Australia, the Chairman of the Industries Assistance
Commission must give the Minister written notice of all direct and indirect pecuniary interests in any corporation carrying on business in Australia. Commissioners must disclose to the Chairman interests which may conflict with their duties,
and Commissioners must not exercise power in which they have a pecuniary
interest unless the interest is recorded in the Minutes and disclosed in any report.
Industries Assistance Commission Act, 1973, § 20. See also Trade Practices Act,
1974-1977, § 17. Some moves in Australia are now being made to have a public
register for senior public servants and members of government agencies, and for
other persons in sensitive areas such as purchasing, allocating grants, and awarding contracts. Such persons arguably possess a greater degree of power, influence,
and initiative in decision-making than back-bench M.P.'s. A Royal Commission
in Britain, however, found the idea or such disclosure by civil servants to be
objectionable on two grounds: the first was that civil servants only advise and
implement decisions made by politicians; the other was that while politicians
choose to enter public life, civil servants do not. While the first of those grounds
appears clearly fallacious, the second is much more cogent.
130. RIORDIAN REPORT, supra note 4, at 37-38. Cf. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON
COMPANIES
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found the idea of such disclosure by civil servants to be objectionable on two grounds: the first was that civil servants only advise
and implement decisions made by politicians; the other was that
while politicians choose to enter public life, civil servants do not.'3 '
While the first of these grounds appears clearly fallacious, the
second is much more cogent.
B. Regulating Behavior
Senator Paul Douglas once remarked that gifts, sponsored
travel, and similar gratuities begin as pure friendship but conclude
as a purchase. "It is, therefore, common practice for an official to
yield and to allow his private feelings of obligation and gratitude
to sway his decisions. He comes to pay off his private debts by
giving away public rights."' 3 2 Most gifts or sponsored travel do not

amount to bribery because specific intent to influence a particular
decision cannot be proved. Similarly, rules governing the payment
of fees to legislators for professional services do not reach most gifts
or travel expenses.' 3 Tentative moves have been made in each of
the three countries under consideration herein to specifically regulate gifts and sponsored travel. Legislators in Britain and the
United States must publicly disclose gifts and travel reimbursements, and congressmen are also prohibited from accepting gifts
having "substantial value" from those "having a direct interest in
legislation before the Congress."' 34 By convention, Ministers in
Britain may not accept gifts or services which would place them
under any obligation.1 5 An Australian Minister is expected to surrender any gift received unless he pays the government its valuation and may not accept any overseas travel from commercial
sources for himself or his family.' 6 Codes of conduct and regulations in Britain, the United States, and Australia regulate the
acceptance of gifts and sponsored travel by civil servants.'37
AUSTRALIAN GovERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 235 (1976).
131. SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 170, 181.
132. P. DOUGLAS, supra note 87, at 49.
133. T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 233, at 142-44. Cf. AusTL. CONST. § 45 (iii);
E. CAMPBELL, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN AUSTRALIA 146-54 (1966); J. KIRBY,
supra note 87, at 60-61; STRAuss REPORT, supra note 52, at § 114.
134. MANUAL AND RULEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 44; RULES OF THE
SENATE, § 43. For the text of the rules, see text accompanying note 107 supra.

850 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 86, 409 (1973).
PARL. DEB., H.R. 3343, 3348 (June 8, 1978) (Austl.).
Civil service Pay and Conditions of Service Code and Establishment
Officers' Guide §§ 9882-85, 9892-93, reprinted in SALMON REPORT, supra note 3,
135.
136.
137.
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The use of official information for the pursuit of private pecuniary advantage has attracted criminal sanctions for some time. Unfortunately, existing law suffers considerable deficiencies: it applies mainly to disclosure of information and makes little provision
for personal misuse, as when an official learns of government financial plans and buys stock in anticipation of its rise in value. 3 ,
Although statutory inadequacies are supplemented by codes of
conduct, the need for legislative revision remains. 3 9 Even if adequate legislation had been enacted, problems of enforcement
would remain. Other legislative techniques thus become relevant:
requiring divestment of assets where misuse of information might
enhance their value, and limiting post-separation employment.
The movement of executives between public and private sectors-the "revolving door"-is not as great a problem in Britain
and Australia as in the United States. Only isolated controversies
have arisen involving British and Australian Ministers entering
private industry, perhaps because no legal restrictions exist
against post-separation employment."' While United States civil
servants spend only a relatively short time in federal employment,
government service in Britain and Australia is a lifetime career.
One reason for the limited mobility in Britain and Australia is the
fact that government employees accrue substantial superannuation benefits which they would lose by resignation or early retirement. Moreover, the British and Australian civil services provide
ample promotion prospects, whereas many senior positions in the
United States are political appointments and thus are effectively
closed to career civil servants.'
Post-employment rules have been drafted for British civil servat app. 11 [hereinafter cited as Esta Code]; see also Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, § 5, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Public Service
Regulations, § 37 (Austl.); SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 216-20; DRAFr
GUIDELINES, supra note 126 at 19-20.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976); Crimes Act, 1914-73, §§ 70, 79 (Austl.);
Official Secrets Act, 1911, § 2 (Brit.); Public Service Regulations § 34(a) (Austl.);
See generally SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 182-93. Such misuse may be a
breach of the common law duty of confidence. See P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
139-41, 150 (1977).
139. 54 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 556-58 (1913) (Asquith's Ministerial Code);
Esta Code, supra note 137, at §§ 4131, 9904; DRAFr GUIDELINES, supra note 126,
at §§ 3.12, 4.24-4.26.
140. 854 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 11 (1973); 667 id. 999-1003 (1962).
141. See generally G. CAIDEN, THE COMMONWEALTH BUREAUCRACY (1967); R.
CHAPMAN, THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE IN BRITAIN (1970).
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ants in addition to the laws regarding the disclosure of official
information. The rules require that senior British civil servants,
members of the armed forces, and civil servants in sensitive positions must obtain government approval within two years of resignation or retirement before accepting offers of employment in any
business which has received government contracts, subsidies,
loans, or similar benefits, or in any other entity in which the government is a shareholder, with which departments or the services
are in a special relationship, or which are semi-public organizations.4 2 The rules are administered to avoid the appearance of
impropriety:
They aim at avoiding any suspicion-however unjustified-that
serving officers might be ready to bestow favours on firms in the
hope of future benefits. They also seek to guard against the risk that
a particular firm might be thought to be gaining an unfair advantage over its competitors by employing an officer who, during his
service, had access to technical information that those competitors
could legitimately regard as their own trade secrets.'
Doubts have been expressed about the effectiveness of the rules,
and a government White Paper has conceded the need for legislative amendment to strengthen the rules.'44 Australian guidelines,
on the other hand, simply suggest that staff contemplating postseparation employment with business should consult their supervisors if any questions of impropriety might arise.1 5 This system,
however, may soon yield to a more formalized approach.'4 6
A great deal of concern has recently been raised concerning the
"revolving door" in the United States between government and
private industry. Two major problems have been identified resulting from the "revolving door." First, businessmen appointed to
government positions may be so business-oriented that they are
unable to recognize the existence of a public interest conflict. 47'
Second, the former public official has acquired not only a knowledge of policies, law, and procedures, but also may gain an intangi142. 894 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 495-96 (1975); SALMON REPORT, supra note
2 at §§ 199-209 & 15.
143. SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at § 201.
144. THE CIVIL SERVICE, CMND. No. 7117, § 27 (1978).
145. DRAFT GUMELINES, supra note 126, at § 3.21.
146. See COMMITrEE OF INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY H.C.
Paper No. 124 at 98-100 (1974).
147. E.g., Lanoette, The Revoling Door - It's Tricky to Try to Stop It, 10 NAT'L

J. 1796 (1977).
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ble influence by virtue of the network of friendships and moral
obligations arising from his years in the service.
Former officials of the executive branch of independent agencies
may not participate in or attempt to influence any judicial, departmental, or agency proceedings regarding matters in which the government has a direct and substantial interest and in which he
"personally and substantially" participated."' Furthermore, for a
period of two years after government employment ceases, a former
official must not so act regarding matters which were actually
pending under his official responsibility within one year prior to
the termination of his employment. Former senior officials who,
within a year after government employment, represent or assist
others before their former agencies on matters in which such department has a direct and substantial interest may be subject to
penalties.'
Problems of enforcement of these provisions may still exist, however, because of the lack of clear definitions of these offenses.'"0 A
recent survey showed that in 1976 the Public Integrity Section of
the United States Justice Department investigated only 35 conflict
of interest cases and prosecuted none, although six are pending. I'
President Carter has seemed to recognize that existing provisions on employment subsequent to government service are inadequate. Presidential appointees have been required to make certain
assurances regarding later employment in addition to the legislative requirements.'52 The Carter Administration's proposals to slow
down the "revolving door" by legislation are embodied in the Ethics in Government Act 1978.'11
The changes in this Act have been criticized on several grounds.
The new law has been viewed as being too harsh for ordinary government employees even though it is indeed acceptable for high
148.

18 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).

149. Id.; 12 id. § 1812. The prohibition does not extend to bank holding companies. For an example of state provisions, See Note, Remedies for Conflicts of
Interest Among Public Officials in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. Rnv. 600, 611-12 (1973).
150. Rhodes, Enforcement of Legislative Ethics: Conflict Within the Conflict
of Interest Laws, 10 HARv. J. LEGIs. 373, 384 (1973). Cf. United States v. Nasser,
476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1973) (prosecution of I.R.S. agent).
151. Federal Ethics and FinancialDisclosure: Hearings on H.R. 6954, H.R.
2733 and H.R. 3928 Before the Subcomm. on Employee Ethics and Utilization of
the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79
(1977) (letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti).
152. Ethics Statement, supra note 116, at 57.
153. S. 555, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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appointments by the President. Various government agencies have
also complained that such a law would inhibit efficient operation.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's operations affect
many businesses, so that the one-year ban would affect most positions to which former officials might aspire. Moreover, younger
officials in the SEC will be forced to make premature decisions
concerning their careers.'5 4 A final criticism is that the proposals
do not come to grips with enforcement difficulties. The law would
still attempt to prohibit activities which are not easily identified,
and the problem of satisfying the criminal standard of proof for
establishing specific intent would remain.
The British administrative scheme may thus be a more attractive model for dealing with the post-government service employment problem. The British scheme allows situations to be handled
in a flexible manner so that the post-employment ban could be
waived in appropriate cases. The British scheme, however, needs
guidelines which can be applied flexibly to ensure that discretion
is exercised in a consistent and equitable manner. In addition, an
administrative scheme needs legal review for cases where recommendations are ignored. Sanctions will be particularly effective if
they are aimed at an employer who wrongly employs former government employees.
C. Divestiture
In recent years, disclosure rather than divestiture has been employed to remedy conflict of interest problems. Policy-makers have
decided that divestiture would deter certain able people from filling public positions.'55 In general, legislators are not required to
divest in any of the three jurisdictions considered."' British and
Australian Ministers are expected to resign any corporate directorships except in family corporations which are not engaged in extensive trading. The rules governing the ownership of stock entreat a
Minister to avoid the danger of conflict of interest, although in
practice some Ministers actually divest stock in corporations
154. Finance Disclosure Act: Hearings on H.R. 1, H.R. 9, H.R. 6954 and
Companion Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

155.

See B.

MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW

6 (1964).

156. Members of Congress may need to divest to stay within rules requiring
that outside earned income not exceed fifteen percent of aggregate salary. See
H.R. Res. 287, § 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. Res. 110, §101, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
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which are closely related to their departments."'
In the United States, some Presidents have taken a strict view
of conflict of interest. President Kennedy, for example, invested
only in government bonds. Senate committees veto presidential
nominees for appointment to governmental positions for potential
conflict of interest problems on an entirely ad hoc and inconsistent
basis." The Senate Armed Services Committee has required some
nominees to high positions in the Defense Department to sell
shares in corporations doing business with the Department. Secretary McNamara had to sell $1.5 million in Ford Motor Company
stock of which he was president at the time of appointment."'
When David R. Packard was nominated as Deputy Secretary of
Defense in 1969, however, the Committee allowed him to place his
large shareholdings in Hewlett-Packard in a special trust.'60 President Carter has not required divestiture from his appointees except
in limited circumstances. Persons nominated to Levels I and II in
the executive branch must divest their holdings if those holdings
are broadly affected by government monetary and budgetary policy. Generally, exceptions from the requirement of divestiture are
made for real estate interests, investment in government stock,
and other diversified holdings, unless the particular position indicates conflicts arising in government service with respect to a particular interest.' The President regards the transfer of assets to a
suitable blind trust as adequate divestiture.
A strong incentive to divest holdings exists for those in the executive branch or in government agencies in the United States because existing law prohibits an official from participating, personally and substantially, in a matter if he knows that he, his spouse,
minor child, business associate, or any organization with which he
is connected or is seeking employment, has a financial interest
unless he makes full disclosure of his interest beforehand and receives written approval from a supervisor. 6 ' A civil servant is thus
157.

496 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 702-03 (1952); P.M.'s Letter, supra note

125. See also S. ENCEL, CABINET GovERNMENT IN AusTRALIA 139-40 (2d ed. 1974);
I. JENNINGS, CABINET GovERNMET 97-100 (2d ed. 1951).
158. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND FEDERAL SERVICE 95-130 (1960).

159. Hearings on the Nomination of Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
160. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1969, § 4, at 3 col. 6.
161. Ethicsstatement, supra note 116. See also Dwyer v. Kahn 88 Misc. 2173,
387 N.Y.S. 2d 535 (1976).
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1976). Cf. Prices Justification Acts, 1973, § 12
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required to divest if he is constantly obliged to disqualify himself,
although a blind trust.may avoid infringement of.the legislation.
Unfortunately, the provision is so vague as to be only inadequately enforceable. A study by the Comptroller General in 1977
revealed that the system of self-qualification embodied in the law
had failed.1 3 One solution which has been offered would expand to
other departments and agencies the specific prohibitions on the
ownership of shares.6
Blind trusts ' are a possible way to resolve conflict of interest
problems. Potential candidates may not be discouraged from seeking public office if it is unnecessary for them to permanently dispose of their interests. Officials would not have to excuse themselves from considering matters in which the trust has an interest.
Blind trusts are an acceptable way in which members of the Congress and the Executive Branch can avoid public disclosure of their
interests as required by the Ethics in Government Act 1978.
For the blind trusts to work, statutory guidelines or individualized approval by an appropriate body must exist. 66 If such safeguards are not provided, accusations will likely be made that the
blind trust is a sham,'67 and the assets are such that the trustee
has no intention of disposing of them. The Ethics in Government
Act 1978 specifies the elements of a satisfactory blind trust and
(Aust.) (forbidding tribunal member to participate in any matter in which he has
a pecuniary interest). The code of conduct for British civil servants cautions
against shareholdings which might raise a conflict of interest problem. ESTA CODE,
supra note 137, § 4062(e). However, appointees to some statutory authorities and
nationalized industries are screened before appointment. See, e.g., Iron and Steel
Act, 1975, c. 64 §3 sched. 1. The Australian rules apply to a few statutory authorities. See e.g., Insurance Acts, 1973, § 12 (2).
163.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL

HIGH-LEVEL EXECUTIVE

OF THE UNITED STATES, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FOR
OFFICIALS: THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND THE NEW

(1977).
164. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1976) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 30 id. §
6 (Mines Department); 15 id., § 2053(c) (Consumer Product Safety Commission).
165. See generally Conflict of Interest Hearings,supra note 104. For a history
of blind trusts see White, To Have or Not to Have - Conflicts of Interest and
FinancialPlanning for Judges, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 202, 216 (1970).
166. The Civil Service Commission has established informal criteria, which
apparently have not been adhered to. See CoMPRmoLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 163, at 21-22. The Senate has also established standards. See
S. Res. 265, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
167. This has been said of President Carter's blind trust because no intention
exists for the trustee to sell any portion of the peanut business. ECONOMIST, June
8, 1977, at 41.
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also requires its approval by an appropriate individual. The trustee
must be an independent financial institution, attorney, certified
public accountant, or broker. Any asset transferred to the trust
must be free of any restriction with respect to its transfer or sale
unless such restriction is approved. Furthrmore, the trust instrument must contain the following prohibitions: The trustee may not
consult or communicate with an interested party; the trust tax
return must be prepared by the trustee and the information (other
than trust income) kept confidential; the person, his spouse, or any
dependent child with a beneficial interest in the trust must not
receive any information about the holdings and sources of income
of the trust, except information on the total cash value or the net
income (or loss). Officials must publicly disclose the terms of the
trust instrument and the nature of assets transferred to the trust.
Blind trusts do not necessarily build public confidence in government; they run counter to the strong current in favor of public
disclosure. Public disclosure in excess of the identity and category
of value of the interests initially placed in the trust, and perhaps
of the trust document, would destroy the efficacy of the trust because the public official would know of its assets. A further problem is the cost and complications of establishing a blind trust.'68
D.

Machinery

Codes of conduct have some attraction as a method of implementing conflict of interest rules, whether they relate to disclosure,
regulation, or divestiture. Codes are more flexible than criminal
provisions; they clarify new or complex situations where basic
moral principles are uncertain and it is too early to draft or apply
law; they enhance the influence of progressive elements in an institution and thus tend to raise standards of the whole, and they
furnish a basis for instructing new members of the group of their
obligations." 9 The difficulty inherent in many codes is that they
are vague and difficult to implement. They often contain ineffective and inadequate sanctions and enforcement machinery. The
establishment of a committee or body charged with interpreting
168. See generally SENATE COMM. ON GovERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, BLaND TRUSTS,
S. Rep. No. 639, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
169. See generally Kernaghan, The Ethical Conduct of CanadianPublic
Servants, 4 OPTIMuM 15 (1973); Monypenny, A Code of Ethics as a Means of
ControllingAdministrative Conduct, 13 PuB. AD. REv. 184 (1953); Note, Practical

Considerationsin the Formulationof a Code of Ethics for Government, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 113 (1952).
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codes and vigorously applying their provisions would be a step
toward ensuring adequate enforcement.'70
Although the limits on the power of the British and Australian
Parliaments to discipline Members for contempt have never been
judicially determined, the House of Commons has claimed power
to expel Members since the sixteenth century.' Dishonesty has
been an element in most instances of expulsion, but corruption
determined by parliamentary or official inquiry would probably be
sufficient even where criminal guilt is not established.7 2 Lesser
improprieties, such as manipulating and transferring interests to
avoid public disclosure, could be dealt with by reprimand or suspension for a limited period. The United States Supreme Court has
upheld congressional power to expel or otherwise punish a congressman after he has been seated, but in the past the power has
been exercised sparingly.' Legislative corruption and impropriety
have ordinarily been exposed by the press rather than by the legislatures. Moreover, a marked incapacity of legislatures to establish
effective machinery to unearth misbehavior of members has been
frequently demonstrated. That these deficiencies may be the result
of a "club spirit" or because the partisan political process overshadows the ethical concerns is irrelevant. 4 It is no answer that ultimately an errant legislator will be disciplined by the electorate.
The electorate is often uninformed and incapable of making a
proper assessment of impropriety. Even if rejection by the electorate does occur it will likely take a considerable period of time for
the member to be totally discredited and disapproved.
Codes and rules can be enforced internally by disciplinary measures: civil servants can be reprimanded, fined, transferred, de170. Hence the proposal for an Office of Government Ethics. See Conflict of
Interest Hearings,supra note 104, at 818-74 (statement of Comptroller General).
171. TASWELL & LANOMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTfUTIONAL HISTORY 583-85 (11th ed.
1960) British courts are reluctant to interfere. See, e.g., Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12
Q.B. Div'l Ct. 271 (1884).
172. Campbell, Expulsion of Members of Parliament,21 U. TORONTO L.J. 15,
20-21 (1971). In Armstrong v. Budd, [1969] 1 N.S.W.R. 649, the New South
Wales Court of Appeal held that state's Parliament could expel members to
protect its high standing in the community where failure to do so would undermine public confidence and the relationship of trust and confidence among its
members.
173. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204-05 (1880); See generally U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 5.
174. J. KuRy, supra note 87, at 112. See also E. BEARD & S. HORN, CONGRESSIONAL ETHics 25 (1975).
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moted, and ultimately dismissed. Internal disciplinary sanctions
are worthless, however, once a civil servant has resigned or has
been dismissed. Ordinary law must then be applied. Furthermore,
the following constraints can be adopted to encourage propriety:
careful initial selection of civil servants, providing incentives for
loyal service, and limiting unnecessary discretion for the official to
fulfill the government's interest." 5 Clear evidence has shown that
guidelines, particularly in the area of government purchasing,
would have reduced the incidence of past impropriety through the
inordinate exercise of discretion.' 6 Oversight machinery for government decision-making such as the Freedom of Information Act
in the United States and the Ombudsman concept in Britain and
Australia have played a significant role in ensuring impartiality,
fairness, and adherence to rules."'
Limitations upon the utility of codes of conduct and internal
disciplinary measures suggest that statutory protections remain
necessary. Frequently, criminal statutes are difficult to apply because of the hazy nature of offenses and because of the fact that
penalties are disproportionate to the wrongdoing. Yet more imaginative use of legislative penalties can be suggested. A statutory
right allowing the government to set aside an agreement with a
business for impropriety in which the latter is implicated is one
possibility. ' Model standing orders concerning such a right have
been promulgated for the Department of Environment in Britain
and allow cancellation of a contract for bribery and the recovery
of any resultant loss. ' If a more severe penalty is needed, consideration might be given to depriving a business implicated in such a
conflict of future government contracts for some time.
175. Banfield, Corruptionas a Featureof Government Organization, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 587, 588 (1975).
176. See, e.g., P. DouGLAs, supra note 87, at 40-43; SALMON REPORT, supra note
3, at 203-04. (Memorandum of evidence by The Times).
177. "Auditing compliance with the rules on standards of conduct should be
given equal importance with auditing appropriate funds": Report of the Carter
Task Force on Outside Income, Investments and Post-Service Employment,
reprinted in Proposalto Establisha Commission on Ethics and FinancialDisclosure: Hearings on H.R. 3829 Before the Subcomm. On Employee Ethics and
Utilization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 125 (1977).
178. Cf. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961)
(government refusal to enforce contract negotiated by consultant with conflicting
interests).
179. SALMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 123.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The law and practice relating to conflicts of interest in the
United States, Great Britain, and Australia vary in part because
of the differences between the three nations. Members of the British and Australian Parliaments have little influence: for example,
all financial grants and charges upon the public revenue must be
initiated by Ministers.'80 By contrast, members of Congress initiate
financial measures, and can exert much stronger pressure on government departments and agencies than their British and Australian counterparts. On this basis the more extensive disclosure required of members of Congress may be justified. Assuming the
same amount of impropriety among legislators in the three countries, the mass media in the United States is much more probing
than in Britain or Australia and uncover impropriety with far
greater frequency. 18' Consequently, the legitimacy of United States
institutions is challenged to a greater degree and stronger measures
on conflict of interest are arguably needed to reassure public opinion.

Far fewer differences exist between the British and Australian
systems. Parliamentary life in Britain requires less time and is less
financially rewarding than in Australia. Conflicts are thus more
likely to arise because of the outside interests of Members of Parliament, and their registration appears to have greater justification
2
than in Australia."8
Criminal acts of bribery, as well as the ownership of and speculation in financial interests, subsequent employment, gifts, campaign contributions, and hospitality have been identified as the
main sources of modern conflict of interest problems. Bribery law
in the three countries plays only a limited role in controlling the
more subtle forms of corruption. None of the three countries has
come to grips with the question of subsequent employment of legislators and public officials by commercial interests with which they
180. Austl. Const. § 56; L. CRIsP, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 288-94
(3d ed. 1973); I. JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT, 254-58 (2d ed. 1957); J. ODGERS, AUSTRALIAN SENATE PRACTICE 374, 388-89 (5th ed. 1976). See generally J.
THE BRITISH CABINET 594-99 (3d ed. 1977).

181.

MACKINTOSH,

See Kernaghan, Codes of Ethics and Administrative Responsibility 17

CAN. PUB. AD. 527, 530 (1974).

182. This fact recognized by Parliamentary renumeration tribunals.

REVIEW

BODY ON Top SALARIES, FIRST REPORT: MINISTERS OF THE CROWN AND MEMBERS OF

PARLIAMENT CMND.

(1978) (Austi.).

No. 4836, § 36 (1971);

RENUMERATION TRIBUNAL ACT, § 10
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dealt in their official capacities. Such "revolving door" movement
between public and private sectors is difficult to control because
it is often viewed as beneficial for society. Australia has scarce
managerial and professional resources and needs the expertise of
businessmen and farmers to direct its regulatory agencies and
commodity boards on a part-time basis. Critics argue, however,
that the revolving door reflects the existence of a power elite in
advanced industrial societies.' 3
Disclosure rather than regulation is the main tool used by the
United States, Britain, and Australia for coping with conflict of
interest problems. As explained previously, extensive public disclosure is only a partial solution because it leaves undefined what
constitutes proper behavior. Some self-policing occurs when persons dispose of interests which they think the public or their
superiors will recognize as conflicting, but as long as no standards
exist as to what should be divested, those who are prepared to
brave the criticism will remain.' 4
Corruption, as Lincoln Steffens argued, may be inevitable in
capitalist systems which exalt power, wealth, and status, because
these endowments are available to the individuals who seek
them.' 5 New opportunities for impropriety have arisen with the
growth of government, its fragmentation, and its extensive links
with industry. Yet public confidence would seem to be enhanced
by machinery which enables those suspecting impropriety to be
heard and which allows a matter to be quickly resolved. Adequate
legal rules, proper procedures, and ethical guidelines are necessary
to reduce the recurrence of conflict of interest problems.
183. See, R. MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1969); C. W. MILLS,
THE POWER ELITE (1965); J. PLAYFORD, NEO-CAPrrALISM IN AUsTRALIA (1969).
184. See S. WATZMAN, CONFLICT OF INTEREST 78-79 (1971).
185. J. STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904).

